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Abstract—The classic influence maximization problem finds a
limited number of influential seed users in a social network such
that the expected number of influenced users in the network,
following an influence cascade model, is maximized. The problem
has been studied in different settings, with further generalization
of the graph structure, e.g., edge weights and polarities, target
user categories, etc. In this paper, we introduce a unique influence
diffusion scenario involving a population that split into two
distinct groups, with opposing views. We aim at finding the top-k
influential seed nodes so to simultaneously maximize the adoption
of two distinct, antithetical opinions in the two groups, respec-
tively. Efficiently finding such influential users is essential in a
wide range of applications such as increasing voter engagement
and turnout, steering public debates and discussions on societal
issues with contentious opinions. We formulate this novel problem
with the voter model to simulate opinion diffusion and dynamics,
and then design a linear-time and exact algorithm COSiNeMax,
while also investigating the long-term opinion characteristics in
the network. Our experiments with several real-world datasets
demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed
algorithm, compared to various baselines.
I. INTRODUCTION
A central characteristic of social networks is that it facili-
tates rapid dissemination of information among large groups
of individuals [7], [13]. Online social networks, such as
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Flickr, and Digg are used for
spreading ideas and messages. Users’ behaviors and opinions
are highly affected by their friends in social networks, which
is defined as the social influence. Motivated by various real-
world applications, e.g., viral marketing [12], social and polit-
ical campaigning [11], social influence studies have attracted
extensive research attention. The classic influence maximiza-
tion problem [22], [12] identifies the top-k seed users in a
social network such that the expected number of influenced
users in the network, starting from those seeds and following
an influence diffusion model, is maximized. The budget k on
the seed set size usually depends on how many initial users the
campaigner can directly influence by advertisements, re-tweets
from “bots”, free samples and discounted prices.
In reality, societies are complex systems, and polarize into
groups of individuals with dramatically opposite perspectives.
This phenomenon is also evident in online social networks
based on political affiliations, religious views, controversial
topics, personal biases and preferences [18]. Therefore, each
campaign is generally launched and promoted with certain
target audience in mind, e.g., all Republican voters, people
who prefer jazz over metal music, or Android over iPhones,
etc. Often, online campaigns have limited budgets and can-
not afford to directly reach to all members of their target
population. In such scenarios, it is desirable to minimize the
number of seed users as permitted by the budget, while still
maximizing the spread of the campaign in the target audience.
Furthermore, due to the existence of subgroups with dif-
fering views, relationships between social network users also
include negative ones, such as foe, spite, and distrust relations.
Indeed, signed social networks containing both positive and
negative relationships are ubiquitous [39]. For example, in the
explicit category, users can directly tag the polarity (positive
or negative) to the relation between two users, e.g., Epinions,
Slashdot, Ebay, and other online review and news forums. In
the implicit category, the relationship polarities can be mined
from the interaction data between users, such as, in Twitter a
user u may support some users whom she follows (positive)
and be against the others (negative). Following common sense
and past literature on signed networks (including the structural
balance theory) [5], [27], [28], [13], we assume that positive
relations carry the influence in a positive manner, that is, a
user would more likely trust and adopt her friends’ opinions.
On the other hand, negative relations tend to carry influence in
a reverse direction, i.e., if a user’s foe chooses some opinion,
the user would more likely be influenced to select the opposite
one. Our assumption supports the principles that “the friend of
a friend is a friend”, “the enemy of a friend is an enemy”, “the
friend of an enemy is an enemy”, and “the enemy of an enemy
is a friend”. Ignoring such relationship polarities between
users and treating signed social networks as unsigned ones
would result in over-estimation of positive influence spread,
thereby leading to lower-quality solutions. Social influence
can be further complicated when competing campaigns are
simultaneously spread over a signed social network. Therefore,
influence and opinion dynamics in a signed social network is a
critical problem that, unfortunately, remains pretty much open.
In this work, we investigate a novel influence diffusion
problem: COSiNe (Contrasting Opinions Maximization in a
Signed Social Network). We aim to find a limited number of
influential seed nodes which maximize the adoption of two dis-
tinct, antithetical opinions in two non-overlapping user groups
with opposing views, respectively. The main objective behind
such influence maximization is to create general awareness
in a population by improving the quality of the debate on
naturally contentious issues without inadvertently introducing
prejudiced ideas.
• Applications. An ideal application of our problem would
be to increase awareness about infrequently discussed issues
that are nonetheless controversial (such as capital punishment,
nuclear energy, or affirmative action) — in a target population
that naturally splits into two distinct ideological groups (such
as democrats and republicans); in a forum that extensively
debates topics and proposes mutually agreeable solutions
based on compromise, diversity, and inclusion (such as the
United States Senate or House of Representatives). Contrary
to initial expectations, polarization of opinions and increased
conflict can often be beneficial [9], [21], [37], [16], [1], [34],
[4], as discussed in the following.
The benefit of the conflicting opinions of various individ-
uals collaborating together can be measured clearly on the
online encyclopedia: Wikipedia. Wikipedia uses a six-category
scale (ranging from “stub” to “featured article”) to determine
the quality of its articles, which are entirely crowd-sourced.
Controversial articles such as those on the Syrian Civil War,
Israel/Palestine, or George W. Bush attract a higher number of
edits. The community debate can be seen on the “talk page”
of each article. It has been found that higher polarization in
the contributing community is associated with higher article
quality for a broad range of articles – ranging from politics to
science and social issues [37], [9].
Increased diversity is often correlated with greater busi-
ness performance [35]. Similarly, disagreements amongst co-
workers have been found to improve the decision making
capabilities at the organisation level; with a recent study from
Columbia Business School stating “cognitive conflict (that
is, differences in information, knowledge, and opinions) can
be a critical source of competitive advantage” [34]. Thus,
there is a clear merit in allowing and even encouraging
different opinions about the same topic to flourish in a business
setting. This can be leveraged to improve the productivity of
the organisation [16], [4]. When dealt with correctly, such
differences in thought and opinions are a force for good.
Lastly, we illustrate an example from the world of politics
that is most similar to our “ideal” application scenario. Unlike
the American presidential system, in countries based upon
the Westminster parliamentary system, there is an appointed
head of government, different from the head of the state, and
an appointed head of opposition. This balance between the
government and the opposition is considered integral to the
success of a functioning democracy in diverse countries such
as in Britain and in India [1]. An equivalent analysis was
made for the political system in the United States of America
in 1950 by the American Political Science Association [21]
which recommended a stronger two party system in order to
strengthen the democratic process. Both these analyses point
to the importance of opposition in political discourse, and
go on to show that policies being enacted and implemented
benefit from engagement, and even opposition. Meaningful
discourse and spirited debate requires people who inherently
hold opposing beliefs on a given issue, and thus maximizing
opposing influences can be beneficial for a legislative body
from the point of view of the general population.
• Challenges and contributions. Contrasting opinions max-
imization, as required in our problem setting, is a non-trivial
one. First, one must employ an influence cascade model that
has properties different from those for commercial, one-time
product purchasing based marketing strategies. For example,
people’s opinions change over time; thus, activation based
models, such as independent cascade (IC) and linear threshold
(LT) models [22] are less appropriate in political contexts.
Second, in reality a signed social network might not be
perfectly balanced [28], that is, there may not exist a partition
V1, V2 of the node set V , such that all edges with V1 and V2
are positive and all edges across V1 and V2 are negative. Such
a network does not follow the social balance theory, and adds
more complexity to the social influence cascade.
In this work, we employ the voter model [10], [20], [14],
[28] to characterize influence diffusion in the two population
groups of a social network. We define our model such that
opposite influences, when applied on the same user, cancel
each other, leading to a decay in the influence strength on any
given user. Our model does not mandate that a user’s choice be
frozen upon one-time activation, explicitly allowing the user
to switch opinions at later times. Moreover, voter model, being
a stochastic one (it has a random walk based interpretation,
which will be introduced in Section II), can deal with signed
networks that are not perfectly balanced. We then define our
novel COSiNe problem (contrasting opinions maximization),
and design an efficient, exact solution.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We study the novel problem (COSiNe) of finding the top-
k seed nodes that maximize the adoption of two distinct,
antithetical opinions in two given non-overlapping sets of
target users, respectively, in a signed social network. We
adapt the voter model to formulate our problem in §II.
• We design a linear-time, exact solution (COSiNeMax)
for our problem. We demonstrate the correctness and
derive time complexity of our algorithm in §III.
• We further characterize two different long-term opinion
dynamics in a signed social network under extreme
scenarios, and investigate how our proposed method,
COSiNeMax finds the seed nodes intelligently under
such extreme situations (§IV).
• We conduct a thorough experimental evaluation with sev-
eral real-world signed social networks to demonstrate the
effectiveness and efficiency of our algorithm, compared
to various baseline methods (§V).
II. PRELIMINARIES
We model a social network as a signed, directed graph
with edge weights: G = (V,E,A), where V is the set of
nodes (users), E ⊆ V × V is the set of directed edges (links,
connections, follower/followee relations, etc.), and A is the
weighted adjacency matrix with Aij 6= 0 when the edge
(i, j) ∈ E, with Aij being the weight of the edge (i, j).
The weight Aij represents the strength of j’s influence on
i. Moreover, as we consider a signed graph, the adjacency
matrix A may contain negative entries. A positive entry Aij
indicates a positive relation, i.e., i considers j as a friend or
i trusts j, whereas a negative entry Aij denotes a negative
relation, that is, i considers j as a foe, or i distrusts j. The
absolute value |Aij | represents the strength of this positive or
negative relation — the higher, the stronger. We further denote
by A+ and A− the (unsigned) matrices with only positive and
negative entries of A, respectively. Thus, A = A+ −A−.
A. Information Diffusion Model
The voter model was first introduced in [20], [10] to
investigate territorial conflicts between two species and more
abstractly, the properties of infinite systems of stochastic
processes. It was then studied for maximizing influence in
unsigned networks [14] and over signed networks [28]. We
update the model from prior attempts in order to more natu-
rally simulate the spread of two contrasting ideas, O1 and O2,
simultaneously in the same network.
We associate with each node a floating point value C in
the range [−1, 1], that probabilistically determines the node’s
adopted idea O1 or O2. The diffusion happens at discrete time
steps, and the C value at every node can change with each time
step. The opinion or idea adopted by node i at time step t is
represented by Ct(i): Ct(i)→ 1 implies that the user is likely
to adopt the idea O1 at time step t, whereas Ct(i) → −1
denotes that the user is likely to adopt the idea O2 at time
step t. In particular, the probability of node i adopting idea O1
at time t is defined as p(O1) =
1+Ct(i)
2 , and the probability
of i adopting idea O2 at time t is p(O2) =
1−Ct(i)
2 . The
two probabilities are defined so that they always sum up to
one. In our voter model, each node starts uninfluenced in the
beginning, i.e., Ct = 0 at time t = 0, except those nodes being
influenced as seed nodes for ideasO1 orO2 by the campaigner.
For seed nodes, C0 = 1 and C0 = −1, respectively.
At every time step t, each node i ∈ V adopts the idea of
its outgoing neighbour j ∈ V with probability p =
|Aij|
Σl|Ail|
if
Aij > 0, and adopts the opposite idea if Aij < 0. Formally,
Ct(i)
= Σj∈V
(
A+ij
Σl∈V |Ail|
Ct−1(j)
)
− Σj∈V
(
A−ij
Σl∈V |Ail|
Ct−1(j)
)
= Σj∈V
A+ij −A
−
ij
Σl∈V |Ail|
Ct−1(j)
(1)
There is also an alternative, random walk interpretation of
this voter model [28]. In this interpretation, we consider a
walk across the graph that starts at an arbitrary node u. At
each time step, from the current node i, an outgoing edge
i → j is chosen with probability p =
|Aij |
Σl|Ail|
for the random
walk. This walk is deemed to terminate at time t on some
node v. Then, according to the voter model, Ct(u) = C0(v) if
the path u→ · · · → v has an even number of negative edges
(a positive path), and Ct(u) = −C0(v) if the path has an odd
number of negative edges (a negative path).
By defining the voter model this way, opposite influences
on a particular node tend to “cancel” out. The voter model also
allows the opinion of a user to flip between two contrasting
ideas, based on her neighbors’ influences. Thus, our voter
model is different from one-time, activation-based influence
propagation models (e.g., independent cascade (IC) and linear
threshold (LT) models [22]), and we employ it to study opinion
diffusion and formation in online signed social networks.
B. Problem Statement
Two non-overlapping groups V1 and V2 among the social
network users are given as an input to our problem, such that,
V1 ∩ V2 = φ and V1 ∪ V2 ⊆ V . The campaigner aims at
influencing all nodes in V1 with the idea O1, and all nodes in
V2 with the idea O2. Clearly, the users outside both the groups
V1 and V2 have no business value to the campaigner.
We define an opinion vector Ct, according to the opinions
of all the nodes in our network at any specific time t. Thus,
for a network with |V | = n nodes:
Ct =


Ct(0)
Ct(1)
...
Ct(n− 1)

 (2)
The voter model can be described in matrix form in terms
of the opinion vector and a transition matrix P = D−1A.
Here, D is a diagonal matrix that consists of all entries of
(A+ +A−) · 1 in its diagonal. From Equation 1, we get:
Ct(i) = Σj∈V
A+ij −A
−
ij
Σl∈V |Ail|
Ct−1(j)
=⇒ Ct(i) = Σj∈V
Aij
Σl∈V |Ail|
Ct−1(j)
=⇒ Ct = D
−1
ACt−1 = PCt−1 = P
t
C0
(3)
Similar to the opinion vector, we define a partition vector
ρ to describe two target populations V1 and V2. We define
element ρi in this vector, for each node i ∈ V , as below:
ρi =


+1 . . . if i ∈ V1
−1 . . . if i ∈ V2
0 . . . if i ∈ V ∧ i /∈ (V1 ∪ V2)
(4)
The effectiveness ǫt of the advertising campaign across both
target populations can now be measured by using the scalar
product formula ǫt = ρ
T · Ct. This promotes opinion O1
in partition V1 and opinion O2 in partition V2, while also
penalising the reverse situation, that is, O1 in V2 and O2 in V1.
The formulation correctly ignores the opinions of the nodes
that do not belong in either V1 or V2, that the campaigner is
agnostic towards. It is worth noting that ǫt is a function of
three parameters. (1) Future time step t: input to the problem,
(2) ρ: which defines two non-overlapping target groups and is
provided as an input to the problem, and (3) C0: the seed set
that needs to be determined.
We consider budget k on the number of seed nodes, which
is an input parameter. We are now ready to define our problem.
Problem 1. [COSiNe] Given a signed, directed graph with
edge weights: G = (V,E,A), a future time step t > 0, ρ
vector which defines two non-overlapping target groups V1, V2
for two contrasting ideas O1 and O2, respectively, and a
budget k on the total number of seed nodes, find the top-k
seed nodes, together with their advertisement types (between
O1 and O2), such that the effectiveness ǫt = ρ
T · Ct of the
campaign is maximized.
III. ALGORITHM: SHORT-TERM OPINIONS MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we design an efficient and exact algorithm
for the COSiNe problem and with a given, finite time step
t > 0. We refer to this as “short-term” since t could be small
and we do not look for characteristics of the opinion dynamics
as t→∞. The long-term case will be discussed in Section IV.
Our strategy for finding the most influential seed nodes
is as follows. We compute the amount of influence of each
node on the rest of the network at time t. It turns out that,
according to our voter model, selecting the top-k individually
most influential nodes as the seed nodes is equivalent to the
set of k nodes with the highest influence. The correctness of
our algorithm is proved in Section III-A.
Our complete algorithm, COSiNeMax is given in Algo-
rithm 1. To find the individual influence power ǫ(i) of each
node i ∈ V , we simulate random walks in the reverse direction
of the actual influence diffusion (Lines 1-14). The number of
walks terminating at a specific node can thus be used as a
measure of the node’s ability to influence other nodes, based
on our voter model. We next select the top-k nodes having the
maximum absolute influence power individually as the seed
set (Lines 15-37). Furthermore, for a seed node j, if ǫ(j) is
positive, it is influenced with idea O1; otherwise the seed node
is influenced with O2 (Lines 29-33).
A. Proof of Correctness
We prove the correctness of Algorithm 1 in two steps.
First, we show that the aggregate of the individual influence
of k nodes is identical to the influence strength of the set
consisting of the same k nodes together (Theorem 1). Second,
we demonstrate that the seed set formed by the top-k nodes
as selected by Algorithm 1 is indeed the best seed set given
inputs G, t, k, and ρ (Theorem 2).
Theorem 1. Let ǫt = ρ
T ·Ct be the total influence of a seed
set Ω consisting of k nodes. We denote by ǫt(i) the individual
influence of a node i ∈ Ω. Then, ǫt =
∑
i∈Ω ǫt(i).
Proof. We denote by Ω the seed set with k nodes. The subset
of seed nodes influenced by the idea O1 is denoted as Ω
+,
whereas the subset of seed nodes influenced by the idea O2
is denoted as Ω−. Clearly, Ω1 ∩ Ω2 = φ and Ω1 ∪ Ω2 = Ω.
Let ǫt be the total influence by the seed set Ω, whereas we
represent by ǫi(t) the individual influence when the seed set
consists of the single node i ∈ Ω.
Consider three vectors e1, e2, and ei, each having di-
mensionality |V |. They represent various subsets of Ω: ei
consists of |V | − 1 zeros, with only the i-th element being
±1 (depending on whether i has been influenced with idea
O1 or O2, respectively), representing the singleton set {i}.
Analogously, e1 consists of +1 corresponding to all nodes in
the set Ω1, and e2 consists of −1 for all nodes in the set Ω2.
The rest of the elements in e1 and e2 are zeros. Formally,
e1(j) =
{
0 if j /∈ Ω1
+1 if j ∈ Ω1
e2(j) =
{
0 if j /∈ Ω2
−1 if j ∈ Ω2
ei(j) =


0 if j 6= i
+1 if j = i, j ∈ Ω1
−1 if j = i, j ∈ Ω2
(5)
Thus, e = e1 + e2 is the vector denoting the seed set Ω =
Ω1 ∪Ω2. Next, we derive the following.
Algorithm 1 COSiNeMax: Maximize Contrasting Opinions
Require: Signed graph G = (V,E,A); time step t > 0; ρ
vector to define two non-overlapping target groups V1, V2
for two contrasting ideas O1, O2, respectively; budget k
Ensure: Set Ω of top-k nodes, with their advertisement types
(between O1 and O2), that maximizes ǫt = ρ
T ·Ct
1: P = D−1A ⊲ Transition Matrix of G
2: ǫ← [0, 0, 0, . . . , 0] ⊲ Initialise row vector of size |V |
3: for i← 1, |V | do
4: if i ∈ V1 then
5: ǫ[i]← +1
6: else if i ∈ V2 then
7: ǫ[i]← −1
8: else
9: ǫ[i]← 0
10: end if
11: end for
12: for i← 1, t do
13: ǫ = ǫ ·P
14: end for
⊲ ǫ is distribution of reverse random walks at time t
15: Ω← Φ ⊲ Ω is a set of tuples 〈i ∈ V, τ(i)〉
⊲ τ(i) denotes the individual influence of node i
16: for j ← 1, |V | do
17: if size(Ω) ≤ k then
18: insert (Ω, 〈j, |ǫ[j]|〉)
19: if ǫ(j) > 0 then
20: Opinion(j)← O1
21: else
22: Opinion(j)← O2
23: end if
24: else
25: 〈i, τ(i)〉 ← min(Ω) ⊲ min is based on τ() values
26: if |ǫ[j]| > τ(i) then
27: remove (Ω, 〈i, τ(i)〉)
28: insert (Ω, 〈j, |ǫ[j]|〉)
29: if ǫ(j) > 0 then
30: Opinion(j)← O1
31: else
32: Opinion(j)← O2
33: end if
34: end if
35: end if
36: end for
37: return Ω, Opinion(i : i ∈ Ω) ⊲ Optimal seed nodes,
with their advertisement types between O1 and O2
ǫ = ρT ·Ct = ρ
T · (P te) ⊲ Following Equation 3
= ρT ·P t(e1 + e2) = ρ
T · P t (Σi∈Ω1 (ei) + Σi∈Ω2 (ei))
= Σi∈Ω(ρ
TP tei) = Σi∈Ω(ρ
TCt(i)) ⊲ Following Equation 3
= Σi∈Ωǫi
(6)
Hence, the theorem.
Theorem 2. The seed set Ω, consisting of the top-k individu-
ally most influential nodes as selected by Algorithm 1, is the
optimal seed set having size k.
Proof. Notice that Algorithm 1 selects the top-k individually
most influential nodes into the seed set Ω. Therefore, the
following holds: ǫj ≥ ǫi for all nodes i, j ∈ V , such j ∈ Ω
and i 6∈ Ω.
We demonstrate that for any other seed set Ω′, such that
Ω′ 6= Ω, |Ω′| = |Ω| cannot have more influence than that of
Ω. Let us define ω′ = Ω′ \ Ω, ω = Ω \ Ω′, and o = Ω′ ∩ Ω.
Note that since the size of both Ω and Ω′ is k, |ω′| = |ω|.
We prove by contradiction: Following Theorem 1, and if
possible, we assume that Σi∈Ω′ǫi > Σj∈Ωǫj . Then, we get:
Σi∈Ω′ǫi > Σj∈Ωǫj
=⇒ Σi∈ω′∪oǫi > Σj∈ω∪oǫj
=⇒ Σi∈ω′ǫi +Σi∈oǫi > Σj∈ωǫj +Σj∈oǫj
=⇒ Σi∈ω′ǫi > Σj∈ωǫj
=⇒ ∃(i ∈ ω′, j ∈ ω) such that ǫi > ǫj
=⇒ ∃(i /∈ Ω, j ∈ Ω) such that ǫi > ǫj
(7)
This contradicts that Algorithm 1 selects the top-k individually
most influential nodes into the seed set Ω. Hence, the theorem.
B. Time Complexity Analysis
Time complexity of our algorithm is: O(|E|t) as follows.
Transition matrix calculation. Line 1 finds the transition
matrix P. This is an O(|E|) operation, as it involves using
the element-wise absolute values in A, calculating D, and
finally computing D−1 · A. Note that real-world networks
are generally sparse, thus A can be represented as a sparse
matrix with |E| non-zero elements. Inverting D is an O(|V |)
operation, since D is a diagonal matrix: The inverse of a
diagonal matrix is obtained by replacing each element in
the diagonal with its reciprocal. Finally, D−1 · A can be
computed in O(|E|) time via sparse matrix multiplication,
as each diagonal element of D−1 is multiplied with exactly
one element of A, and this forms a non-zero element in the
transition matrix P. Moreover, it is easy to verify that P will
have |E| non-zero elements.
Initialisation of ǫ. This requires time O(|V |) in lines 3-11.
Random walk simulation. The slowest step in the algorithm
is random walk simulation in lines 12-14. In this phase, we
requireO(|E|t) time. Since ǫ is a one dimensional vector, each
multiplication in line 13 costs O(|E|) due to sparse matrix
multiplication, and this operation is repeated t times.
Seed set selection. Finally, in lines 15-37 we select the top-k
nodes with the individually highest absolute influence power.
This is similar to choosing the top-k elements in an unordered
list, and can be accomplished in O(|V | log k) time.
Thus, time complexity of our algorithm is bounded by the
random walk simulation, and the time complexity is: O(|E|t),
which is linear in the size of the input graph.
IV. LONG-TERM OPINIONS FORMULATION
We now turn our attention to the long-term scenario, that
is, opinion dynamics as t → ∞. In particular, we consider
two extreme scenarios with respect to the two non-overlapping
groups V1 and V2 in the signed social network. For simplicity,
in this section we shall assume that V1∪V2 = V and the graph
is strongly connected.
• Socially balanced partitions: With respect to partitions
V1, V2, all intra-partition edges are positive, and all inter-
partition edges are negative. • Socially anti-balanced parti-
tions:With respect to partitions V1, V2, all intra-partition edges
are negative, and all inter-partition edges are positive.
Remarks. First, even though most real-world datasets do
not exactly fall under the above two categories, a real-world
network could resemble one of them. For example, we observe
that the Tagged dataset [15] that we use in our experiments,
has more than three times as many positive inter-partition
edges than all other kinds of edges combined, thereby making
these partitions close to socially anti-balanced partitions. By
analyzing the long-term opinion dynamics for the two cate-
gories, we demonstrate how intelligently our algorithm finds
the seed nodes even under such extreme situations. Second,
we employ our algorithm, COSiNeMax in all scenarios, as
its optimality has been proved in §III-A irrespective of future
time step t (i.e., short-term vs. long-term), graph structures,
and node partitions.
For ease of discussion, we define a signed path in a signed,
directed social network as a sequence of nodes with the edges
being directed from each node to the following one. The length
of the path is the total number of directed edges in it. The sign
of a path is positive if there is an even number of negative
edges along the path; otherwise the sign of a path is negative.
A. Socially Balanced Partitions
Recall that the campaigner’s objective is as follows: At time
step t, all nodes in V1 will adopt opinion O1, and nodes in V2
will adopt opinionO2. We next show that if the input partitions
are socially balanced, then by following our algorithm, at t→
∞, indeed nodes in V1 will adopt opinion O1 and nodes in
V2 will adopt O2.
To prove this, it is easy to verify that all paths that begin
and end in the same partition have positive signs (due to even
number of negative edges on those paths). Analogously, all
paths that begin in one partition and end in the other partition
must have negative signs because of odd number of negative
edges on them. This has two implications as given below.
First, COSiNeMax will select all seed nodes of O1 only
from the users in V1, and all seeds for O2 only from V2. This
is because in Lines 4-7 of Algorithm 1, all nodes in V1 starts as
positive, and in partition V2 all nodes starts as negative (at t =
0). Now, repeated multiplications with the transition matrix P
(Lines 12-14) can be considered as a union of random walks.
Therefore, at any arbitrary future time step t, all nodes in V1
would remain positive, because all random walks starting at
V1 and also ending at V1 must consist of only positive paths.
Similarly, at any arbitrary future time step t, all nodes in V2
would remain negative. Now, in Lines 29-33, the seed nodes
are influenced based on their final sign, that is, if positive then
influenced with opinion O1, and otherwise with opinion O2.
This concludes that the seed nodes for O1 will only be selected
from group V1, and those for O2 will be picked only from V2.
Second, for socially balanced partitions, if all seeds of O1
are from V1, and all seeds for O2 are from V2, then at t →
∞, nodes in V1 will adopt opinion O1 and nodes in V2 will
adopt O2. This holds because each path from any seed in
V1 to some other node in V1 will always be a positive path,
thereby carrying the same opinion as that of the seed (i.e., O1),
whereas every path from a seed in V2 to some other node in V1
will be a negative path, thereby carrying the opposite opinion
to that of the seed (i.e., also O1).
B. Socially Anti-balanced Partitions
We show that if all seeds of O1 are from V1, all seeds for O2
are from V2, and when t→∞, then anti-balanced partitions
switch opinions between O1 and O2 at even and odd time
steps, respectively.
1) Even time steps: For even time steps, we consider paths
of even lengths. Among such paths, all paths that begin and
end in the same partition have positive signs (due to even
number of negative edges), and all paths that begin and end
in different partitions have negative signs (due to odd number
of negative edges). Hence, this is identical to the situation in
socially balanced partitions, and similar results hold. In other
words, (1) COSiNeMax will select all seed nodes of O1 only
from the users in V1, and all seeds for O2 only from V2. (2) For
socially anti-balanced partitions, if all seeds of O1 are from
V1, and all seeds for O2 are from V2, then at t → ∞, with t
being even, nodes in V1 will adopt opinion O1 and nodes in
V2 will adopt O2.
2) Odd time steps: For odd time steps (with t→∞), one
can follow similar reasoning to show that the opposite case
arises. We now consider paths of odd lengths. Among such
paths, all paths that end in the same partition as they began
have negative signs (due to odd number of negative edges),
and all paths that end in the opposite partition as they began
have positive signs (due to even number of negative edges).
This results in swapping of opinions for the two partitions,
relative to the ones in an even time step.
Notice that COSiNeMax intelligently selects seed nodes:
When the objective is to maximize the adoption of O1 at V1
and O2 at V2 in an odd time step, in anti-balanced partitions
as t→∞, COSiNeMax will select all seed nodes of O1 only
from the users in V2, and all seeds for O2 only from V1.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We show empirical results to demonstrate effectiveness and
efficiency of our solution, and compare it with three baselines.
We analyze sensitivity of COSiNeMax by varying several
parameters, e.g., number of seed and targets, time steps.
A. Environment Setup
Our code is implemented in Python, using sparse ma-
trix operations from the scipy library, and the experiments
were performed on a single core of a 16GB, 1.8GHz, In-
tel i7-8550U processor. Each experimental result is aver-
aged over 10 runs. Our source code and datasets are pub-
licly available at: github.com/COSiNe Max/COSiNe-Max and
drive.google.com/drive/folders/1hHn14eYehzRp8nk sup Rfn-
hahXDDjjmn?usp=sharing, respectively.
TABLE I: Dataset characteristics
Dataset #Nodes #Edges #Positive Edges #Negative Edges
Epinions 132 585 701 926 605 854 (86%) 96 072 (14%)
GitHub 44 914 44 100 700 26 185 530 (59%) 17 915 170 (41%)
Tagged 5 607 448 546 799 071 443 895 613 (81%) 102 903 458 (19%)
TABLE II: Tagged: Signed
edge weight distribution
Cat. Weight #Edges
1 -1.0 5 762K (0.67%)
2 -0.9 9 361K (1.09%)
3 -0.5 139 379K (16.24%)
4 -0.1 202 003K (23.53%)
5 0.3 150 877K (17.58%)
6 0.8 350 724K (40.87%)
7 1.0 137K (0.02%)
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1) Datasets: We summarize our datasets in Table I. (1)
Epinions. This social network dataset is extracted from
the product review website epinions.com, where users may
trust or distrust others [31]. It is a signed and directed
network: A user trusting another is represented with an
edge of weight +1, and distrusting another is denoted by
weight −1. The products being reviewed fall into one of
34 unique verticals, and we, uniformly at random, partition
these verticals into two categories. The nodes are then split
into two non-overlapping partitions V1 and V2 depending on
the product categories that they review. (2) GitHub. The
dataset (blog.github.com/2009-07-29-the-2009-github-contest)
is extracted from an anonymized dataset of user-repository
interactions on github.com, utilising information about users
”watching” other’s repositories. We classify users into par-
titions V1, V2 based on whether the most used language
in their watched repositories is among the top-10 most
popular languages following TIOBE index: tiobe.com/tiobe-
index/programming-langu ages-definition/. We connect any
two users in the network with a bidirectional edge if they
watch the same repository, with edge weight inversely pro-
portional to the number of watchers for that repository. The
sign of this edge is positive if both nodes view more single-
language repositories (or, both view more multi-language
repositories), and negative otherwise (i.e., one views single-
language repositories and the other views multi-language
repositories). The signed edge weight distribution is shown in
Figure 1. (3) Tagged. Our largest real-life dataset is collected
from the online social network tagged.com [15]. The nodes are
partitioned into V1 and V2 using anonymized gender metadata.
Moreover, each edge of the network belongs to one of seven
categories. This categorical information is converted into a
signed edge weight as given in Table II: The intuition is to
have many modestly weighted positive and negative edges
(i.e., edge weights between -0.5 to 0.8), and only a few edges
with very high positive and negative edge wights (i.e., edge
weights -1.0 or +1.0).
2) Competing Methods: We compare the proposed
COSiNeMax method (Algorithm 1) with three baselines. (1)
Random. Uniformly at random selection of k seed nodes. (2)
Degree. The top-k nodes with the highest out-degrees. (3)
Individual InfMax. In this baseline approach, we follow the
voter model over signed networks [28], however we consider
each target set separately. That is, we first compute the top-
⌊k/2⌋ seed nodes so to maximize the spread of the idea O1 in
the target partition V1. Next, we find another top-⌊k/2⌋ seed
nodes that maximize the spread of the idea O2 within the target
set V2. Therefore, by comparing with the Individual Influence
Maximization approach as described above, we demonstrate
the improvements due to our algorithm COSiNeMax, which
returns the top-k optimal seed nodes considering the spread
of two contrasting ideas O1 and O2 simultaneously.
For each baseline, at t = 0 we target a seed node i with
idea O1 if i ∈ V1, and with O2 if i ∈ V2.
3) Parameters Setup: #Seeds. We set the default number
of seed nodes as 5% for Epinions and GitHub, while 1% for
Tagged. This roughly translates to 7K, 1.3K, and 56K seeds
in Epinions, GitHub, and Tagged, respectively. For sensitivity
analysis, we vary the number of seeds from 0.8% to 90% (i.e.,
1K to 120K) in Epinions.
#Target nodes. In the experimental setting, we consider all
nodes in the network as the target set of the campaigner. For
sensitivity analysis, we vary the number of target nodes from
15% to 90% (i.e., 20K to 120K) in the Epinions dataset. The
target nodes are selected uniformly at random, and then we
split them into two non-overlapping partitions V1 and V2 based
on the categories of products that each user reviews.
Time steps. We consider time steps up to 30 (short-term); for
the long-term scenario we exhibit up to 500 time steps.
4) Evaluation Metrics: We employ two metrics for the
effectiveness measure.
Expected number of correctly influenced nodes. We com-
pute the number of nodes influenced by idea O1 in target
partition V1, and by O2 in target partition V2. Recall that the
probability of node i adopting idea O1 at time t is defined as
p(O1) =
1+Ct(i)
2 , and the probability of i adopting idea O2 at
time t is p(O2) =
1−Ct(i)
2 . Here, Ct(i) ∈ [−1, 1] is computed
following Equation 3.
Moreover, we disregard weakly influenced nodes, i.e., node
i ∈ V1 when its p(O1) is less than a predefined threshold
(0.5), and i ∈ V2 when its p(O2) is less than a predefined
threshold (0.5). Such a user is likely to be undecided between
two opposite opinions on a specific issue. Formally, we report
the following.
Expected number of correctly influenced nodes
= Σi∈V1,Ct(i)>0
(
1 + Ct(i)
2
)
+Σi∈V2,Ct(i)<0
(
1− Ct(i)
2
)
Influence percentage w.r.t. all targets as seeds. We also
measure campaign effectiveness constrained by a limited num-
ber of seeds, with respect to the hypothetical scenario when
all target nodes can be employed as seeds. We recall that in
Section II, the effectiveness of the campaign was formulated as
ρT ·Ct. This promotes opinion O1 in partition V1 and opinion
O2 in partition V2, while penalising the reverse situation, that
is, O1 in V2 and O2 in V1.
To better compare the aforementioned campaign effective-
ness of each baseline and our proposed algorithm, we compare
it to the case when all target nodes are assigned as seed nodes.
At time step t = 0, the seeds are influenced with the respective
idea of the target partition that they belong to. According to
the voter model, opposite influences on the same node cancel
each other out, thus there could be a decay with time in the
magnitude of influence. Let us denote by Tt the campaign
effectiveness at time step t in this scenario (i.e., when all target
nodes were seed nodes at t = 0).
Finally, we report (ρ
T ·Ct
Tt
×100)% as the influence percent-
age w.r.t. all target nodes used as seed nodes.
B. Effectiveness Results
We present effectiveness results on three networks (Fig-
ure 2). We find that our designed COSiNeMax achieves higher
expected number of influenced nodes than all three baselines.
Notice that Epinions (Figure 2(a)) shows some reduction in the
expected number of correctly influenced nodes with larger time
steps till it saturates. Such reduction is not observed in GitHub
and Tagged. This is due to higher sparsity of Epinions, with
the presence of many separated components, each consisting
of a few nodes. In such a sparse network, random walks
from seed nodes initially influence a large number of nodes.
However, this influence is unable to sustain at later time steps
due to sparsity of the graph. In other words, the sparsity of
the network prevents long random walks from returning to the
same nodes, thereby reducing the influence over time.
When we compare the influence percentage (w.r.t. all targets
as seeds) of each algorithm, COSiNeMax also outperforms
all baselines (Figure 3). However, the peak value obtained in
each dataset is different, with Epinions having the highest at
120%, GitHub having 55%, and Tagged at 40%. The sparsity
of Epinions dissipates the total influence Tt very rapidly,
reducing it by almost 75 % in the first time step itself. This
quick decrease in influence is prevented with COSiNeMax by
selecting the seed nodes more intelligently, thus achieving the
peak value at higher than 100%.
The oscillatory plots of the baselines in Tagged (Fig-
ures 2(c), 3(c)) can be explained based on graph structure
and node partitions. Tagged has more than three times as
many positive inter-partition edges than all other kinds of
edges combined, thereby making these partitions close to
socially anti-balanced partitions. Thus, if the seed nodes in
the two partitions are not targeted by O1 or O2 intelligently,
as it is done in case of baselines (see Section V-A2), such
oscillatory behaviour in influence spread arises. This is similar
to the oscillatory behaviour discussed in Section IV due to
socially anti-balanced graph partitions. COSiNeMax is able
to circumvent this problem by targeting all seed nodes in V1
as O1 when maximizing influence for even time steps, and as
O2 when maximizing influence for odd time steps.
C. Efficiency Results
We compare running time to find seed nodes by all algo-
rithms in Figure 4. While time taken increases almost linearly
with time steps for both COSiNeMax and Individual InfMax,
it is evident that both Random and Degree are faster, and
their seed set finding times are independent of input time step.
In case of Individual InfMax, the seed nodes are computed
in two stages: once for opinionO1 in the target set V1, and then
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Fig. 2: Expected number of correctly influenced users for different time steps. Seeds are selected according to various algorithms.
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Fig. 3: Influence percentage w.r.t. “All Seed” for different time steps. Seeds are selected according to various algorithms. “All Seed” denotes
the case when all target nodes are used as seeds, and influenced by the respective idea at t = 0 (this metric is defined in Section V-A4).
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Fig. 4: Running time to find seed nodes according to various algorithms.
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Fig. 5: Sensitivity analysis w.r.t. varying number of seed nodes, Epinions.
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Fig. 6: Sensitivity analysis w.r.t. varying number of target nodes, Epinions.
for opinion O2 in the target set V2. However, COSiNeMax
holistically identifies all seed nodes in the entire graph. This
explains why COSiNeMax is faster than Individual InfMax
over two smaller graphs. On the other hand, COSiNeMax
requires more time than Individual InfMax over Tagged, which
is a larger dataset and the complexity of performing random
walks over entire graph dominates seed set finding time.
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Fig. 7: Results on long-term opinions formation, Epinions, #seeds=1% of all users.
D. Sensitivity Analysis w.r.t. #Seeds & #Targets
We investigate sensitivity of the algorithms w.r.t. numbers
of seed and target nodes. In Figures 5 and 6, we present
sensitivity analysis results using Epinions, generated for two
time steps, t = 3 (short-term) and t = 200 (long-term). Finally,
we also revisit the variation with time steps, and study longer-
term dynamics, with time steps from 0 to 500 (Figure 7).
We find that the superior performance of our algorithm,
COSiNeMax — both in terms of (a) expected number of
correctly influenced nodes and (b) influence percentage (w.r.t.
all targets as seeds) — is maintained for all parameter config-
urations. Our empirical results demonstrate that COSiNeMax
finds the best quality solution regardless of the target set size,
seed set budget, and input time step.
In regards to long-term dynamics, we find that all algo-
rithms, except the Random baseline, achieves saturation over
time, with no further variation in influence. The expected num-
ber of correctly influenced nodes and the influence percentage
(w.r.t. all targets as seeds) in this saturated state are both higher
for our COSiNeMax than the baselines.
VI. RELATED WORK
Influence maximization in social networks. The classic
influence maximization problem finds a limited number of
seed users that generate the largest expected influence cascade
in a social network. Kempe et. al. [22] designed the linear
threshold (LT) and the independent cascade (IC) models, and
developed approximation algorithms having theoretical per-
formance guarantees. However, the computation of influence
cascade is still #P-hard following both IC and LT models [8].
Lappas et. al. introduced the concept of target marketing and
k-effectors — by identifying k seed nodes such that a given
activation pattern can be established [25].
Competitive Influence maximization. Influence maximiza-
tion in the presence of a negative campaign was investi-
gated in [2], which assumes that the later campaign has
prior knowledge of rival side’s initial seed nodes. Bordin et.
al. [3] analyzed the similar problem under the LT model;
while [6] attempts at preventing the spread of an existing
negative campaign in the network. However, as competitive
new products from rival companies are often launched around
the same time, [29], [23] considered influence maximization in
the presence of multiple competing campaigners, who promote
their products in a social network around the same time.
Complementary influence maximization was proposed in [30]
for promoting complementary products together.
Our work is fundamentally different from prior literature.
First, they generally consider activation based models (e.g.,
IC and LT) suitable for one-time product purchase. In contrast,
our voter model allows users to switch opinions at later
times based on their neighbors’ opinions. Thus, voter model
is more suitable to study opinion diffusion and formation
in online social networks. Second, although earlier works
consider multiple competitive campaigns, different from our
study they do not consider diffusion with both positive and
negative edges in a signed social network. Third, due to
the inherent complexity of IC, LT models and their variants,
the problems investigated in those works are generally NP-
hard and also #P-hard, while the voter model can solve our
problem exactly in linear time.
Signed social networks. Signed network research dates back
to 1940’s with the work of Heider [19], and was formalized
by Harary and Carwright [5]. Signed networks have recently
become popular in data mining and social network analysis
(for a survey, see [39]). In [26], Leskovec et al. studied
the structure of social networks with negative relationships
based on two social science theories — balance theory and
status theory. Kunegis et al.[24] investigated spectral properties
of signed undirected networks, having applications in link
predictions and clustering. Tang et al. [39] performed node
classification in signed networks.
Influence maximization in signed social networks. With
the prevalence of signed social networks, recent works inves-
tigated the problem of finding the seed set that maximizes
positive influence, which is also known as positive influence
maximization. [27], [36], [38] studied positive influence max-
imization under different extensions of IC and LT models.
Li et al. [28] explored similar problem in a signed social
network with voter model. Unlike ours, they do not aim at
maximizing two contrasting opinions in two non-overlapping
target regions. Moreover, in [28] all seed nodes can be influ-
enced by only one type of idea, that is, for positive influence
maximization, all seeds will be influenced by the positive idea.
However, as demonstrated in our experiments, maximizing
each influence separately (i.e., Individual InfMax) results in
a sub-optimal solution compared to ours (i.e., COSiNeMax):
We return optimal seed nodes considering the spread of two
contrasting ideas simultaneously.
Measuring and minimizing social polarization. Garimella et
al. detected topics from Twitter data that caused intense debate
[18]. Techniques to reduce polarization and disagreement in
social networks by updating nodes and edges were developed
in [17], [32], [33]. We acknowledge that in certain situations
it is indeed necessary to reduce polarization, as otherwise
created “echo chambers” (a metaphoric situation in which
specific kinds of opinions and convictions are strengthened and
spread through the repetition and continuous communication
among users who share the same kind of thoughts inside a
closed system) may result in extreme conflicts and instability.
However, as we discussed earlier, for public awareness, open
and honest discussion, diversity and inclusion, educated vot-
ing, and towards better democracy, polarization, with certain
regulations, is the key [9], [21], [37], [16], [1], [34], [4]. Our
work is motivated from this perspective.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We formulated and investigated the novel problem of con-
trasting opinions maximization in two distinct target groups,
respectively, over a signed social network. Motivated by
scenarios such as increasing voter engagement and turnout,
steering public debates and discussions on societal issues
with contentious opinions, we adapted the voter model to
effectively study influence diffusion. We efficiently solved this
problem, and designed an exact algorithm. We then empirically
compared this algorithm with several baselines on three real-
world signed network datasets. Our analysis reveals that the
proposed algorithm, COSiNeMax finds the seed set with the
highest expected number of influenced nodes, and has the
highest relative total influence. This behaviour is demonstrated
over all datasets and for different variations of time steps,
seed set budget, and target population size parameters. In
future, it would be interesting to consider adaptive seeding, as
opposed to one-time seeding, for even more effective short-
term opinions maximization in a signed, social network.
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